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Abstract 
The fusion center literature is limited and lacks consensus regarding operational focus and strategic 
priorities. Perhaps the lone consistent finding in this literature is the lack of awareness among 
outsiders regarding what fusion centers do and the capabilities they provide. Contemporary 
communication research indicates the Internet serves as the primary source of information to 
inform what they do not understand. The present study employs a mixed methods approach that 
combines a content analysis of fusion center web content with fusion center self-report data 
gleaned from a federally funded project. This study encompasses 74 of the 77 primary and 
officially recognized fusion centers in the United States. Results indicate that centers provide 
limited information online about their organization and significantly under-report their activities 
and capabilities online in comparison to self-reported tasks. Information available online through 
official fusion centers websites is poor at best. Fusion centers self-report to engage in tasks 
consistent with their information sharing and analytic mission. A context for the findings is 
provided, in addition to recommendations and study limitations.  
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Disparity between Fusion Center Web Content and Self-Reported Activity 
 
Research Purpose 
Fusion centers represent one of the most observable structural change in policing post-
September 11, 2001. At the time of this study, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security officially 
recognized 77 fusion centers throughout the United States. 1  Despite their having received 
substantial resources and serving as a critical source of terrorism and crime information for all 
levels of law enforcement, little is known about these centers. When ambiguity surrounds 
something of interest in contemporary society, law enforcement and the general public often rely 
upon information gathered from the Internet to develop a sense of understanding. Unfortunately, 
this information – even from an organization’s official website – may not be all-inclusive and 
representative of the organization. As a result, the perceptions developed by law enforcement and 
the general public based on this information may be inaccurate and can lead to declines in 
perceived legitimacy and limitations of functional capability.  
Put simply, outsiders may perceive fusion centers to be of limited value and may not seek 
to interact with a fusion center in light of this perception. Though the research evidence regarding 
fusion centers is sparse, a common finding is that law enforcement personnel as well as the general 
public are unaware of fusion center capabilities and that fusion centers desire a capacity to market 
their resources and mission information. The present study examines online content within official 
websites, or webpages, from each of the primary and secondary fusion centers in the U.S. and 
compares this content with data collected from the centers as part of a federally funded project. 
This approach allows for a comparison of self-reported fusion center activity (i.e., what they are 
doing) and web-based information intended to inform outsiders of fusion center capabilities. 
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Results suggest that fusion centers are under-communicating their operations and contributions to 
the law enforcement community.  
 
Relevant Research  
Evolution of Fusion Centers 
Fusion centers are brick-and-mortar entities comprising representatives primarily from 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as well as members of the private sector and 
public works. In theory, this diverse composition of organizations is best positioned to identify 
and understand threats facing a particular jurisdiction or region. The premise of fusion centers is 
that information analyzed from diverse sources results in more accurate intelligence (Clark, 2007) 
through a “fusion” process resulting from analyzed raw intelligence provided by the disparate 
organizations (Carter & Carter, 2009a). Dissemination of intelligence products to relevant 
stakeholders brings the intelligence fusion process full circle and helps to ensure that fusion centers 
do not operate as silos of information (Carter & Carter, 2009b; Ratcliffe, 2008). Each jurisdiction 
has distinctive and diverse needs. As a Congressional Research Service report stated, “There 
appears to be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ structural or operational model for fusion centers” (Rollins, 
2008, p.18). In fact, a large number of centers have undergone changes since their inception in 
order to meet the needs of their constituents.  
Despite the change in focus and specified guidelines and standards to focus fusion center 
operations (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005; Global Intelligence Working Group, 2008), 
operational gaps and quantifiable knowledge remain missing from the discussion of fusion center 
research. Although the body of literature on fusion centers is growing, more rigorous studies 
regarding their activities are sorely needed. Many of the operational and strategic concerns about 
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fusion centers may be derived from the mission shift from counter-terrorism to all-crimes, all-
hazards, all-threats. The lack of evidence and dynamic operational focus has led to speculation of 
their ineffectiveness (General Accountability Office, 2007; Taylor & Russell, 2012; U.S. Senate, 
2012) and legality (German & Stanley, 2008; Masse & Rollins, 2007; Monahan & Palmer, 2009). 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 articulated the necessity for law 
enforcement to broaden its intelligence focus to include threats other than terrorism, as criminal 
and disaster threats were seen as more likely to inflict damage within U.S. communities. This 
modification yielded a necessary change in 1) the assessment of information needs for fusion 
centers, and 2) the need for fusion centers to communicate their function appropriately to other 
law enforcement agencies, community organizations, and citizens. Thus, from an outsider’s 
perspective, it is imperative to have access to a clear and accurate description of fusion center 
resources and activities.  
 
Limited Fusion Center Evidence 
Few scholars have gained access to fusion centers and begun to examine the intelligence 
process within these organizations. These studies have focused largely on analytic capabilities and 
information sharing activities in the form of information gathering, dissemination, and types of 
relationships. Graphia-Joyal (2010) employed a qualitative study that included 49 interviews at 
four fusion centers in the northeast region of the U.S. Her study concluded that centers had yet to 
develop a robust analytical capability. Rather, they had been providing investigative case support 
that lacked analysis to inform operational, tactical or strategic action (the goal of intelligence 
analysis). With respect to information gathering, a quantitative survey of local law enforcement 
personnel in South Carolina illustrated the utility of the state fusion center and noted rather positive 
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responses (Cooney, Rojek & Kaminski, 2011). Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) examined the volume 
and frequency of information that flowed from local law enforcement to the state fusion center. 
They concluded that 48% of New Jersey troopers had not communicated with the fusion center 
through any mechanisms and that many of the troopers sent information only because they 
believed it would help their investigation – not because it could have implications for terrorism or 
other criminality.  
Perhaps the efficacy of a fusion center may best be captured through the dissemination of 
intelligence products and the utility of those products for stakeholders. Cooney, Rojek, and 
Kaminski (2011) noted that 75% of the police executives found the center to be moderately useful 
or very useful. Conversely, Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) found that more than half (58%) of the 
troopers surveyed had not used intelligence disseminated by the fusion center in the previous six 
months. A general sense of the applicability of fusion center products to end-user operations may 
be challenging given the diversity of end-user needs. Consumers of fusion center products and 
resources are highly varied. This is both a strength and weakness of the fusion center model as 
these centers are designed to promote information and intelligence sharing across disparate 
organizations, but this organizational variation creates hurdles for centers to tailor analytic 
products. For example, in his national survey of fusion centers, Carter (2015) noted that these 
centers have relationships with organizations that include every level of law enforcement, public 
health, public works, the private sector, the military, and even educational institutions. Creating a 
single product that meets specific needs for all these entities is likely unrealistic and beyond the 
resource reach of many centers.  
Lastly and salient to the focus of this research, some scholars have recognized that law 
enforcement may not understand the utility of fusion centers because the centers need to be more 
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proactive in marketing themselves. Studies have noted that the centers do a poor job of 
communicating their analytic services (Chermak et al., 2013; Graphia-Joyal, 2010) and data 
availability (Carter & Chermak, 2012). Ratcliffe and Walden (2010) acknowledged that educating 
local law enforcement is a necessary function for the fusion centers so that consumers understand 
how to use and contribute to intelligence products. In a similar vein, Cooney et al. (2011) found 
that personnel who had received training about a fusion center’s capabilities were more likely to 
rate the center as useful.  
 In sum, the sparse literature to date on fusion centers has lacked consensus regarding the 
activities these centers perform as well as their efficacy and utility to enhance local law 
enforcement intelligence. There does appear to be agreement on the need for fusion centers to 
communicate their capabilities and intent more clearly. Web-accessible information is the medium 
through which outside persons gain an understanding and awareness of things they do not 
comprehend (Case, 2012). As such, this study seeks to inform this research shortcoming by 
examining web content from each of the primary and officially recognized fusion centers in the 
U.S. This information is combined with self-report survey data to illustrate the accuracy of web-
accessible information and, thus, the information outsiders process to learn about fusion centers.  
 
Methods 
This study employs a mixed methods approach to explore the congruence between the 
goals and purposes fusion centers communicate to the public and the activities in which they report 
to engage. Content analysis of websites and webpages is coupled with self-report survey data from 
a national project. The intent of this data comparison is to illustrate the divergence between what 
fusion centers communicate to outsiders and the activity in which they self-report to engage. 
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Capturing this divergence is important given the current literature agrees that few outsiders 
understand fusion centers and that fusion centers desire an ability to market their resources. In a 
study similar to the present research, DeLone (2007) assessed mission statements from the 50 
largest police departments in the U.S. to gauge the extent to which these departments had 
incorporated a reference to terrorism following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. A portion of DeLone’s 
research examined dimensions of police department competencies, measured in the form of 
community policing or fear of crime, as these dimensions were seen as critical to the contemporary 
tasking of municipal police. The present research follows in a similar vein with a focus on the core 
competencies of fusion centers. 
 
Web Content Analysis 
The focus of the present research is on four dimensions of fusion center core competencies. 
These dimensions were derived from two operational documents, co-published by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, that serve as the 
developmental models for fusion centers: the Fusion center Guidelines (Global Intelligence 
Working Group, 2005) and the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2008). These dimensions, each of which has 
multiple traits, target the key function fusion centers provide to law enforcement – facilitating the 
sharing and analyzing of information to prevent threats. The four dimensions of core competencies 
include: 
1. Relationships: Specific reference to having relationships with law enforcement, other 
public services, and private sector organizations for purposes of sharing and collecting 
information.  
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2. Information Collection and Sharing: Specific reference to facilitate the collection and 
sharing of information.  
3. Analysis: Specific reference to analyzing information and/or providing analytic resources. 
4. Areas of Emphasis: Specific reference to a threat type or operational focus.  
 
A list of fusion centers for inclusion in the present study was retrieved from the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s official website, which provides names and contact 
information for each of the primary2 and recognized fusion centers (U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, 2015). Regional crime analysis and real-time crime centers are not included in the present 
study due to their different operational function as compared to fusion centers. Only fusion centers 
recognized by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security are included in the study. Websites and 
webpages were accessed via open source Internet searches. Websites and webpages varied 
dramatically across the fusion centers included in the study. Some fusion centers had a dedicated 
and comprehensive website whereas others were limited to a single webpage hosted on another 
agency’s website (typically the managing agency). Only information available within an official 
website of webpage was reviewed and analyzed for the present study. Though additional 
information about fusion centers may be available from other sources online, the validity of such 
information cannot be verified. Information retrieved from official content pages is assumed to be 
the most valid and representative of the fusion center’s capacity.  
Prior to reviewing the web content, a list of traits was operationalized consistent with 
government recommendations in the two aforementioned federal documents. The researchers 
discussed each trait’s operational definition to ensure a consistent understanding and recognized 
the unit of analysis as the fusion center organization. As a group, the research team reviewed 
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varying websites and webpages to ensure consistency across navigation of the content. All 
hyperlinks and available content, including documents posted to websites, was navigated to best 
capture all available information. Each researcher independently reviewed web content and coded 
the observed traits based on the written coding protocol. Coded data was then compared among 
the researchers and any differences in coding interpretation were reviewed until consensus was 
reached regarding the most appropriate coding of a trait. Traits were grouped in dimensions based 
on the narrative context in which the trait was mentioned within the web content. For example, the 
trait “community” was coded to capture a working rapport with the community. Instances in which 
other indicators were used to signal the trait of interest were also captured and coded. For example, 
the statement “The fusion center seeks to collaborate proactively with citizens to share 
information,” would be coded in the affirmative as a reference to “community.”  If a trait was 
mentioned outside of an appropriate context, it was excluded from the analysis. For example, the 
statement “The fusion center works directly with the law enforcement community” would not be 
captured as a reference to the desired trait.  
The web content sample includes 74 of the 77 officially recognized fusion centers. The 
Puerto Rico National Security State Information Center, the Mariana Regional Fusion center 
(Guam), and the U.S. Virgin Islands Fusion center are excluded due to their lack of available 
information. The fusion centers included in the web content sample were designated 
predominantly as primary centers (66.2%). Roughly half had another fusion center in the same 
state (52.7%) and identified themselves as focusing on “all-threats, all-hazards” (55.4%). Table 1 
lists the fusion centers included in the web content analysis.  
 
 
[ Table 1. Fusion centers included in the study (n=74) approximately here ] 
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Survey of Fusion Centers 
Self-report data were gleaned from a larger project3 and include responses from 96 fusion 
center personnel representing 72 fusion centers. The survey sample of fusion center respondents 
comprised of persons who attended the National Fusion Center Conference (NFCC). Attendees of 
the NFCC include fusion center directors, administrators, and upper-level operational personnel. 
This sampling strategy, which includes nationally representative fusion center personnel, was 
chosen for three reasons. First, in attending this conference, these persons were identified by their 
respective fusion center as a key representative of their organization. Second, as a result of their 
selection on behalf of their center, this sample includes personnel who have a working knowledge 
of key issues tied to their fusion center and its intelligence capacity. Thus, these persons are best 
able to address the organizational capacity of their centers. Third, these persons’ awareness of the 
contemporary intelligence structures, requirements, and formal communication networks involved 
in fusion centers increases the likelihood that they will have direct knowledge about the strengths 
and weaknesses of these issues. This sampling approach to target key knowledgeable personnel in 
law enforcement organizations has been utilized in police research focused on specialty personnel 
when examining similar contemporary issues, such as police assigned to cybercrime (Bossler & 
Holt, 2012; Holt & Bossler, 2012). 
Table 2 displays descriptive information of the fusion centers represented in the current 
study. Responses were reported predominantly by administrators and supervisors. This is 
beneficial to the validity of the responses, as these persons are most likely to have an accurate 
perception of the activities that occur within the center. The modal response category for tenure at 
the fusion center was one to three years at the time the survey was conducted. This is not outside 
the norm, given the nature of turn over within fusion centers as agencies rotate assigned personnel. 
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In the case of newly assigned personnel, having been assigned to the fusion center for only one to 
three years may not be indicative of a lack of knowledge, since assigned personnel are typically 
chosen as a result of their experience in intelligence operations within their home agency.  
 
[ Table 2. Fusion center Respondent Descriptives (n = 96) approximately here ] 
 
Web content traits were matched with survey items in similar contexts. For example, within 
the web content dimension focused on relationships for information sharing, the “community” trait 
was present in the statement “The fusion center seeks to establish a two-way communication 
channel with the community to collect and disseminate terrorism related information.” This trait 
was matched with the survey item question “How close is your working relationship with the 
public community?”  Likert responses to this item included “Very close,” Somewhat close,” 
“Distant,” and “We have no relationship.” Responses in the affirmative - “Very close” and 
“Somewhat close” - were included as being representative of this trait.  
 
Sample Comparisons  
Fusion center characteristics are presented in Table 3 for purposes of comparison between 
the two samples. Overall, the two samples were rather similar across the available metrics. Just 
over half of both the web content (55%) and survey (57%) centers self-identified as focusing on 
“all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats” - implying a diverse set of intelligence related operations that 
go beyond the scope of terrorism. A relatively small percentage of centers from both samples self-
identified as focusing solely on terrorism. This is not surprising, as many centers rely on resource 
support from multiple entities that have varied operational interests, as well as state funding 
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mandates that guide a focus on more general public safety issues. On a related note, each state 
varies with respect to the organization that serves as the chief operating entity. The majority of 
fusion centers within both samples indicated operation by the state police (55% of web content 
centers and 57% of surveyed centers). The remaining centers reported a similar proportion of 
operating entities.  
 
[ Table 3. Sample Comparison approximately here ] 
 
Findings 
Findings are reported and presented in figure format with corresponding tables below. 
Valid percent is presented along the X-axis. Given organizational anonymity of fusion centers in 
the self-report survey (each fusion center was assigned a unique identifier), linking web content 
data to the self-report survey data was not possible. In order to explore if observed differences 
between the two samples were statistically significant, two-sample t-tests (two-tailed) were 
employed to examine mean differences between traits across each sample methodology.4 This 
method was conducted using the t-test calculator (also called the mean-comparison test calculator) 
for summary data in STATA (IC version 14) using the mean, standard deviation, and sample size 
for each observed trait within each sample. Though the use of this procedure with categorical 
variables is less-than ideal, it provides additional insights into the observed differences between 
self-reported activity and information conveyed via websites beyond the substantive differences 
illustrated by the descriptive statistics reported.   
In their most simplistic form, fusion centers are designed to facilitate information sharing, 
analysis, and threat prevention and mitigation through inter-organizational collaboration. The 
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dimensions identified for this research follow in a similar vein. Figure 1 presents comparisons of 
web content traits and survey data items pertaining to relationships for information sharing. To 
begin, each dimension of relationships for information sharing from survey respondents differed 
significantly from information presented online. Not surprisingly, the majority of fusion center 
web content (63%) indicated having relationships with police to share information. Community 
and private sector relationships were equally present (42%). Noticeably fewer centers indicated 
seeking relationships with first responders and public health organizations. When compared to the 
web content sample, survey respondents indicated a stronger presence of relationships across each 
of these traits. More than 90 percent of survey respondents indicated having relationships with 
police. While this number is high (especially when compared to the web content sample), it is also 
somewhat questionable as to why this frequency is not larger given the role of fusion centers to 
work directly with police.  
 
[ Figure 1. Fusion center Relationships for Information Sharing approximately here ] 
 
Further analyses indicate survey respondents that self-report High Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and Military as their main operating entity have distant relationships 
with the police. This same trend is present among web content as those identifying as HIDTA- or 
Military- operated do not make reference to relationships with police. Unfortunately, the available 
data do not allow for a more refined exploration and this finding should likely be the focus of 
future research inquiries in this area. Relationships with first responders (mean difference of .63, t 
= 11.042) and public health (mean difference of .55, t = 5.441) represent the most significant 
difference in the traits, with web content substantially under-reporting these relationship areas 
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compared to the self-report data. Interestingly, four of the five fusion centers that indicated 
working with public health were recognized fusion centers as opposed to primary centers. This 
may be related to the nature of recognized centers, which are typically more location centric and 
focus specifically within their immediate geography. Primary centers, conversely, are responsible 
for statewide issues.  
 Operational tasks likely to result from the above relationships are traits that pertain to 
information sharing and collection. Figure 2 displays traits associated with this operational 
dimension. Most notably there was a rather large and significant difference between self-report 
and web content pertaining to suspicious activity reporting (mean difference of .70, t = 14.803) – 
also known as “See Something, Say Something.” Unfortunately the data do not allow for this 
difference to be examined across organizational characteristics that may shed light on why this 
difference is observed. This finding is unexpected, as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity 
Reporting Initiative, spearheaded by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation among others, has received a great deal of attention and substantial 
resources across the country. Even more perplexing is that SARs are designed to be driven by both 
police and the public. It seems reasonable to assume that fusion centers should project the 
importance of SARs through their websites to inform community members of the effort and to 
solicit any information the latter may be able to provide. Specific reference to information sharing 
(t = 5.083) and information collection (t = 2.181) also differed significantly across the two samples. 
Though different, the descriptive data demonstrate that fusion centers frequently identify these 
dimensions. This is a welcomed finding as the sharing and collection of information is vital to the 
fusion center mission (Global Intelligence Working Group, 2005). Related to this mission, there 
was no difference observed between self-report and web content samples regarding intelligence 
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dissemination. Though welcomed, given these traits are likely the “heart” of fusion center activity, 
it is somewhat interesting to find that roughly a quarter of the centers made no web content 
reference to these traits. 
 
 
[ Figure 2. Information Collection and Sharing approximately here ] 
 
 Moreover, findings from the survey respondents lend some insight with regard to the extent 
these operational traits are actually occurring within centers across the country. This is especially 
welcome with regard to SAR as more than 80 percent of centers noted having a formal SAR 
program. Every survey respondent indicated engaging in information sharing, a welcomed and 
expected finding. Somewhat fewer indicated they engage in information collection (86%) and 
intelligence dissemination (77%). The former finding could be explained by some fusion centers 
perceiving information as being “pushed to them” as opposed to actively collecting information 
(Carter & Chermak, 2012). The latter finding is more perplexing, as fusion centers are tasked with 
sharing information, in particular distributing analytic products to partners and subscribers. Further 
analyses of survey respondents that indicated they do not disseminate intelligence are largely 
isolated to those operated by HIDTA, Military, and State Bureaus of Investigation. These centers 
may have unique tasking that limits the information they disseminate to others and thus could 
potentially influence survey respondent perceptions of intelligence dissemination. Again, a refined 
exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of the data and should be considered in future research.  
 The analysis of raw information may arguably be the most critical function fusion centers 
provide in the greater law enforcement intelligence landscape. Aside from analyzing raw 
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information and connecting disparate pieces of information and intelligence, the centers also 
provide an analytic resource for agencies that do not have this capability (Carter & Carter, 2009b). 
Figure 3 presents the frequency of analytic traits in both samples. Overall, findings indicate 
significant differences between samples across each analysis dimension. Notably, intelligence 
analysis (t = 19.251), process information (t = 14.046), and integrate information (t = 11.004). The 
general absence of these dimensions on fusion centers’ web pages is somewhat discouraging. As 
noted previously, research has found that fusion centers wish to market and communicate their 
mission and capabilities to outsiders to enhance fusion center effectiveness and inform knowledge 
gaps among both law enforcement and the general public. The findings presented here illustrate 
that fusion centers are failing to identify these capabilities on their web pages and are thus unlikely 
to be best communicating this information. This is especially true with respect to intelligence 
analysis – the focal capacity of fusion centers – as only eight percent of web pages indicated this 
dimension.  
[ Figure 3. Analysis Properties approximately here ] 
 
 More promising is the frequency at which survey respondents self-reported their fusion 
center to be engaged in these dimensions of analysis. Evaluation, information processing, 
information integration, intelligence production, and intelligence analysis are all above 83 percent 
with the latter approaching 98 percent. Crime analysis is the lower-bound outlier in this dimension, 
with only 55 percent of centers indicating they engage in this activity. These frequencies may 
speak to the nature of simplicity, or conciseness, within web content. Most fusion center web 
content (82.4%) included a reference to intelligence analysis, with a substantial decrease in the 
other analytic traits. The inclusion of intelligence analysis in fusion center web content differed 
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significantly from the other analytic traits. This decrease could be explained by the fact they are 
considered to be specific tasks in the process of intelligence analysis. Intelligence products, 
integration, evaluation, and process are all components of what is known as the “intelligence cycle” 
(Carter, 2009). It is likely that when composing web content, the inclusion of the term “intelligence 
analysis” may be viewed as encompassing all of these other traits. This could also explain why 
these frequencies were noticeably higher among the survey respondents, as fusion centers are 
engaging in the processes representative of intelligence analysis.  
Finally, a rather broad dimension was explored regarding areas of emphasis for fusion 
centers. There is ambiguity regarding what the centers should focus on (Taylor and Russell, 2012: 
U.S. Senate, 2012) and the threats they attempt to prevent and mitigate (Carter, 2015). These 
centers have also come under criticism regarding civil liberties (German and Stanley, 2008; U.S. 
Senate, 2012) and pressure to serve as a source of training for local law enforcement (Carter et al., 
2013). This range of issues serves as the catalyst for information provided in Figure 4 and are 
grouped as “threats” and “operations” areas of emphasis. In terms of threats, public health (t = 
9.829) and threats (t = 9.463) (survey respondents indicating a focus on general threats in their 
jurisdiction and web content reference to general threats) different most significantly across 
samples.  
The lack of public health as a threat focal point is unclear. Previous research has speculated 
that fusion centers are hesitant to engage public health issues, given the complexities associated 
with the HIPAA laws and the burden of managing such information (Carter & Rip, 2013). It should 
also be noted that the emphasis on public health within fusion centers did not gain official 
recognition until 2011, when the U.S. Department of Homeland Security published a supplement 
to the baseline capabilities guidelines that specifically focused on public health concerns (U.S. 
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Department of Homeland Security, 2011). This late onset may explain the lack of a public health 
presence in fusion center web content. Perhaps, even more simply, fusion centers had not updated 
their web content since their inception. Mechanisms for improved information sharing and inter-
governmental collaboration to best prevent and mitigate public health related threats should serve 
as the basis for future research efforts. It is rather unexpected to find less than half (44.6%) of the 
fusion centers used the term “threat” in their web content, given the emphasis laid out in the two 
federal guidelines. The remaining threat types were not frequently present. No significant 
difference was observed between samples regarding crime, with both self-report (76%) and web 
content (70%) indicating approximately the same frequency. Also worth noting is that this majority 
emphasis on crime perhaps illustrates an operational gap as only 56 percent of survey respondents 
and 23 percent of web content indicated the fusion center having the capacity to engage in crime 
analysis (as reported in Figure 3 above).  
 
[ Figure 4. Areas of Emphasis approximately here ] 
 
With respect to operations, emergency management (t = 11.636) and training (t = 10.865) 
differed most significantly across samples. Further analysis of centers indicating a focus on these 
operations failed to yield any insightful trends. Affirmative responses were noted in primary and 
recognized centers – those operated by state police, municipalities, and state homeland security. 
The lone common characteristic of these centers was self-identification as “all-crimes, all-hazards, 
all-threats” centers. Perhaps aiding in the explanation of the high rate of survey respondents 
indicating they focus on emergency management and training is that many fusion centers receive 
their primary operational funding from their state’s emergency management budget to co-serve as 
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not only a fusion center, but also an emergency operations center during times of crisis (U.S. House 
of Representatives, 2013). In this role, fusion centers also provide training to local partners for 
purposes of crisis management. In a similar vein, it is surprising that few survey respondents (21%) 
and web pages (11%) indicated preparedness as an operational focus given the role of preparedness 
in emergency management (a difference that was non-significant across samples).  
No significant difference was observed across samples regarding civil liberties. Roughly 
half (53%) of survey respondents indicated civil liberties as a focus while reference to civil liberties 
appeared in only 40 percent of the fusion center web content. This percentage is lower than 
expected, given the substantial amount of public scrutiny surrounding fusion centers and the 
perception of retaining identifiable information on citizens without the establishment of a criminal 
predicate. Perhaps more surprising is that web content available on the Internet should serve as an 
ideal communication medium to present organizational concern for civil rights and the extent to 
which the fusion center is observing such rights. The results presented here indicate that few 
centers have taken advantage of communicating this message or may be pursuing this effort 
through other means.  
While the frequency of self-reported emphasis on civil liberties represents a more positive 
outlook when compared to figures reported by the U.S. Senate (2012) and U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2010), it is lower than anticipated. What makes this frequency even more 
surprising is the nature of the question and the belief it would draw a socially acceptable response, 
as fusion centers would be hesitant to answer in the negative. This is especially true given the 
respondents were largely administrators (51%) and supervisors (20%). Additional analysis yielded 
no differences across centers responding in the affirmative versus negative. These findings should 
not be taken as evidence of omission on behalf of fusion centers. A report from the U.S. House of 
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Representatives (2013) found strong compliance with the protection of civil liberties among fusion 
centers studied.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The findings presented here indicate there are significant differences between the 
information fusion centers provide to the public via their web content and the activities fusion 
center personnel self-report. Put simply, fusion centers are short selling their contribution to the 
law enforcement intelligence landscape. Moreover, not only are the activities reported by fusion 
centers significantly more present than portrayed by the centers’ web content, but the information 
generally available on the centers’ websites or webpages is rather minimal. The present study’s 
observation that fusion centers do a generally poor job of communicating their mission, resources, 
and capabilities to both law enforcement and the public via the internet is insightful.  
Research has shown that fusion centers indicate frustration with garnering support and 
participation from external law enforcement agencies and desire to market their resources and 
capabilities to the law enforcement community (Graphia-Joyal, 2010; Carter et al., 2013; Ratcliffe 
& Walden, 2010). Moreover, fusion centers have been the focus of criticism resulting from a lack 
of clear operational priorities (Taylor & Russell, 2012; U.S. Senate, 2012) as well as scrutiny from 
the general public regarding concerns of privacy violations (German & Stanley, 2008; Monahan 
& Palmer, 2009; U.S. Senate, 2012). Given the role webpages play in communicating information 
to the public in contemporary society, fusion centers’ official webpages serve as an initial point of 
information gathering and thus are positioned to remedy the aforementioned concerns if done so 
properly. Unfortunately, it appears fusion centers are not adequately utilizing their webpages to 
effectively communicate information. This forces both law enforcement and the general public to 
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draw inferences about fusion centers based on insufficient information or from other sources that 
may be less favorable toward the centers. 
A recommendation from this research would be for the fusion centers to better 
communicate their capabilities and activities to the public via their web presence. This would not 
only close this communication gap, but could also produce substantial information gains as 
external organizations may be more willing to push information to the centers once the 
information’s intent was understood. This clarity may also enhance the functional capability of 
fusion centers as they rely upon information flow to and from local partners. This lack of 
communication regarding “what fusion centers do” is consistent with the limited previous research 
in this area that concluded one of the most pressing needs for fusion centers was to market their 
capabilities (Graphia-Joyal, 2010; Carter et al., 2013; Ratcliffe & Walden, 2010).  
The present study provides evidence that fusion centers should extend the need for 
marketing to the general public, rather than just the law enforcement stakeholders. This is all the 
more pressing given the negative publicity that fusion centers have received in recent years 
(German & Stanley, 2008; Monahan & Palmer, 2009). It may be due to this publicity that fusion 
centers have felt the need to divulge as little information as possible, but this strategy leaves fusion 
centers vulnerable to the thoughts of the American public still weighing the cost of security in 
terms of violations of privacy.  
Of the analytic traits explored from the web content, less than a quarter of the fusion centers 
made reference to crime analysis, which was also the analytic function least reported by the survey 
respondents. Despite the centers acknowledging an “all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats” model of 
operation, intelligence analysis should be their driving analytic capability. Put simply, the 
differences between crime analysis and intelligence analysis are nuanced (Carter, 2012). A 
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pragmatic reality is that state and local law enforcement agencies are tasked with combating crime. 
Thus, the analytic products they need should focus on this mission. By utilizing methods and 
sources of information from both analytic methods, fusion centers can best position their resources 
to meet consumer needs and have the most direct impact on preventing crime and terrorism.  
 
 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 The temporal convergence of the survey data and web content was not synchronous. 
Survey data was collected from 2009-2010 while web content analyses were conducted from 2014-
2015. Though not perfectly aligned, this temporal gap may not be as troublesome as it appears. 
Many websites and webpages lacked up-to-date content. Approximately 40% of the websites and 
webpages had a copyright date or content update data older than 2013 (ranging from 2011-2013). 
Moreover, the disparity illustrated here is that fusion centers under-report their activities online. It 
is reasonable to assume that self-reported activity will not decrease as a fusion center matures. 
Even though the focal priorities of such centers may change in this time frame, the mission shift 
of fusion centers largely occurred in 2005 and 2006 and has remained constant since. This shift 
occurred prior to the survey data being collected and thus the survey data are likely to be in 
alignment with contemporary fusion center operations.  
 As noted in the description of the samples, survey respondents varied in position within 
their centers. This could be viewed as a strength as the results could reflect the input of individuals 
at various levels of the organization. It could also be viewed as a weakness, as the functions 
performed by individuals in various positions could, and likely do differ. For instance, analysts 
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may report an emphasis on the actions in which they engage, while administrators report that they 
do something much different. This issue is rather common in organizational policing research and 
is viewed as more of a strength than weakness as the current study relies upon insight from all 
levels of the organization (Andrews et al., 2008; Burruss & Giblin, 2014; King, 2000; 2009; 
Maguire & Uchida, 2000). Nonetheless, it is a complexity of the current research that requires 
acknowledgement to guide future works in this area.  
Finally, matching web content traits to survey items was less than pristine. Ideally, survey 
items would have been constructed to capture respondents’ perceptions of a center’s activities that 
are consistent with its mission, capabilities, and competencies, as articulated in the two guiding 
documents used in the present study. Survey items and web content traits were matched as best 
possible to capture the appropriate contexts for both. If a web content trait or survey item was of 
interest but lacked an appropriate comparison item, it was not included in the present study. 
Relatedly, the unit of analysis in the present study is fusion center organizations and the survey 
data are self-reported by an individual within the fusion center on behalf of the organization. 
Though this approach is rather common in policing research, especially in the context of positions 
that require specialized knowledge, it is nonetheless a limitation.  
 To the authors’ knowledge, this study is one of the first in criminology and criminal justice 
to utilize a methodology that compares web content to self-reported organizational activity. Given 
the salience of web content as a medium for communication in contemporary society, scholars 
should seek to further utilize this approach in other areas of criminal justice. As an example, this 
approach may be insightful for identifying mechanisms to improve communication between the 
police, correctional reentry programs, mental health services, and/or court processes and the 
general public who may visit such websites to retrieve information on the criminal justice system 
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or process.  Scholars should also seek to explain the significant differences that were observed in 
the present study, but could not be pursued further due to data limitations.  
Future research should seek to quantify more precisely the extent to which targeted 
stakeholders are unaware of fusion centers’ capabilities and potential deliverables. Such an 
investigation could provide a more granulated illustration about which components are most 
ambiguous for fusion centers stakeholders. Ideally, it would also capture desired stakeholder 
“wants and needs” that could be mapped to the availability (or lack) of such capabilities. It may 
also be possible that certain organizations do not necessarily need to be as informed as others. For 
example, public health or public works organizations may just need to recognize the importance 
of actively pushing raw information from their organization to the fusion center, as opposed to 
needing to know what analytic capabilities can be provided in return. This would help fusion 
centers avoid inundating their stakeholders with information they do not need. More targeted 
emails would lead to more careful readings of disseminated intelligence which could potentially 
spur the flow of information back to the fusion center.  
 
 
Notes
1 For additional information on fusion centers and the National Network of Fusion Centers, visit: 
http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers 
 
2 According to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2015, no pagination): “Primary fusion 
centers serve as the focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, 
gathering, and sharing of threat-related information and have additional responsibilities related to 
the coordination of critical operational capabilities across the statewide fusion process with other 
recognized fusion centers. Furthermore, primary centers are the highest priority for the allocation 
of available federal resources, including the deployment of personnel and connectivity with federal 
data systems.” 
 
3 Grant award number 2008-IJCX-0007 from the National Institute of Justice, US Department of 
Justice. 
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4 A complex survey design in STATA was employed to adjust for clustered responses from 
respondents within the same fusion center. The most responses from within a single fusion center 
was three, which occurred for two fusion centers. Ten fusion centers had two respondents while 
the remaining 70 fusion centers in the study had a single survey respondent. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Fusion Centers Included in the Study (n=74)  
Alabama Fusion Center Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center 
Alaska Information and Analysis Center Nebraska Information Analysis Center 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center Nevada Threat Analysis Center* 
Arkansas State Fusion Center New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center 
Austin Regional Intelligence Center* New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center 
Boston Regional Intelligence Center* New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center 
California State Threat Assessment Center New York State Intelligence Center 
Central California Intelligence Center* North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
Central Florida Intelligence Exchange* North Central Texas Fusion Center* 
Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center* North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center 
Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group* Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center* 
Colorado Information Analysis Center Northern California Regional Intelligence Center* 
Connecticut Intelligence Center Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center* 
Dallas Fusion Center* Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
Delaware Information and Analysis Center Oklahoma Information Fusion Center 
Delaware Valley Intelligence Center* Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center* 
Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center* Oregon Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network 
El Paso Multi-Agency Tactical Response Information Exchange* Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center 
Florida Fusion Center Rhode Island State Fusion Center 
Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center  San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center* 
Hawaii Fusion center  South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center 
Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center* South Dakota Fusion Center 
Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center Southeast Florida Fusion Center* 
Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center* 
Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center  
Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center Southwest Texas Fusion Center* 
Kansas City Terrorism Early Warning Fusion Center* Southwestern PA Region 13 Fusion Center* 
Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center St. Louis Fusion Center* 
Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center* Tennessee Fusion Center 
Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange Texas Fusion Center 
Maine Information and Analysis Center Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center 
Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center Vermont Information and Analysis Center 
Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center Virginia Fusion Center 
Michigan Intelligence Operations Center Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center 
Minnesota Fusion Center Washington State Fusion Center 
Mississippi Analysis and Information Center West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center 
Missouri Information Analysis Center Wisconsin Statewide Information Center 
*Recognized fusion centers are marked with asterisks. Remaining centers are primary centers. 
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Table 2. Fusion Center Survey Respondent Descriptives (n = 96) 
 n (Valid Percent) 
Respondent’s Position  
Administrator 49 (51%) 
Supervisor 19 (20%) 
Investigator 7 (8%) 
Analyst 10 (10%) 
Not Specified 11 (11%) 
Respondent Years at Fusion Center  
Less than 1 Year 10 (10%) 
1-3 Years 39 (41%) 
4-9 Years 26 (27%) 
More than 10 Years 5 (5%) 
Not Specified 16 (17%) 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Sample Comparison 
Trait Web Content (n = 74) 
n (Valid Percent) 
Survey (n = 96) 
n (Valid Percent) 
Fusion center Operational Focus   
All-crimes, All-hazards, All-
threats 
41 (55.4%) 55 (57.3%) 
All-crimes 31 (41.9%) 36 (37.5%) 
Terrorism 2 (2.7%) 5 (5.2%) 
Main Operating Entity   
State Police 41 (55.4%) 55 (57.3%) 
Municipal Police  10 (13.5%) 11 (11.5%) 
State Homeland Security 8 (10.8%) 8 (8.3%) 
State Bureau of Investigations 6 (8.1%) 7 (7.3%) 
County 5 (6.8%) 8 (8.3%) 
HIDTA 3 (4.1%) 3 (3.1%) 
Military  1 (1.4%) 3 (3.1%) 
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Figure 1. Fusion center Relationships for Information Sharing 
 
 Police Community Private Sector First Responders Public Health 
Web content Mean (SD) .64 (.48) .42 (.50) .42 (.50) .15 (.36) .07 (.70) 
Survey Mean (SD) .91 (.32)  .64 (.40) .73 (.40) .78 (.38) .62 (.46) 
Two Samples t (df) 4.176 (168)*** 2.995 (168)** 4.364 (168)*** 11.042 (168)*** 5.441 (168)*** 
***p<.001, **p<.001 
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Figure 2. Information Collection and Sharing 
 
 
Information  
Sharing 
Information  
Collection 
Intelligence  
Dissemination 
Suspicious Activity  
Report 
Web content Mean (SD) .74 (.44) .73 (.45) .72 (.45) .11 (.31) 
Survey Mean (SD) 1.0 (.00) .86 (.28) .77 (.39) .81 (.30) 
Two Samples t (df) 5.083 (168)*** 2.181 (168)* .761 (168) 14.803 (168)*** 
***p<.01, *p<.05 
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Figure 3. Analysis Properties 
 
 
Intelligence 
Analysis 
Intelligence  
Production 
Integrate  
Information Evaluation Crime Analysis 
Process 
Information 
Web content Mean (SD) .08 (.38) .37 (.48) .31 (.47) .27 (.45) .23 (.42) .22 (.41) 
Survey Mean (SD) .98 (.15) .86 (.28) .96 (.22) .83 (.38) .56 (.52) .96 (.22) 
Two Samples t (df) 19.251 (168)*** 7.816 (168)*** 11.004 (168)*** 8.599 (168)*** 4.576 (168)*** 14.046 (168)*** 
***p<.001, **p<.001 
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Figure 4. Areas of Emphasis 
 
 
 
 Terrorism Crime Threats Infrastructure Public Health 
Civil 
Liberties 
Emergency 
Management Preparedness Training 
Web content Mean (SD) .77 (.42) .70 (.44) .45 (.50) .26 (.44) .10 (.29) .41 (.49) .11 (.31) .11 (.31) .10 (.29) 
Survey Mean (SD) .91 (.28) .76 (.40) 1.0 (.00) .75 (.41) .66 (.45) .53 (.48) .78 (.44) .21 (.72) .65 (.37) 
Two Samples t (df) 2.475 (168)* .917 (168) 9.463 (168)*** 7.415 (168)*** 9.829 (168)*** 1.597 (168) 11.636 (168)*** 1.222 (168) 10.865 (168)*** 
***p<.01, *p<.05 
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